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| Pragmatic View of Justification |
| Introduction
“We are all self-consciously critical and we do a better job of [surviving and living in this world] by being self-critical” (Miller in conversation). Because we are self-conscious creatures who have this ability to reflect within ourselves and become self-critical, we are persistently attempting to make current situations better; we are constantly trying to improve ourselves and improve society. As Dewey’s ideology of social philosophy suggests, the concept of an ideal society is not stagnant and thus that ideal is never reached, for there are always flaws due to the fallible nature of human beings. It is for this reason (the fact that the concept of social ideals are always changing, and we are always trying striving for the better ideal) we are interested in knowledge, justification, and, basically every area of study in philosophy. Specifically concerning epistemology, we are interested in developing definitions or concepts for knowledge, justification, beliefs, etc. because there is always a potential for conflict and thus, we have to develop a way to discriminate between what is true and what is not true. Once we determine what’s not true, we have to figure out a way to get rid of these false beliefs. Thus, the processes by which we can discern what beliefs are true and what beliefs are false and the processes by which we can get rid of these false beliefs once they are recognized, is considered to be the main focus regarding the battle between internalism and externalism. I pose the question: are internalism and externalism the best views for justifying beliefs? Is there another view, aside from internalism and externalism, which we can benefit more from in epistemology?
I will begin by defining internalism and externalism and briefly introducingi the problems of each view. Then I will claim neither internalism nor externalism is sufficient enough in our pursuit of truth; i.e. they are both too constrictive. Then, I will propose a “pragmatic” view of justification as the best process to be used for justifying knowledge.
Internalism
Internalism, most simply defined, is the process of justification where justified true beliefs are restricted to what is introspectively accessible to the subject; a person is justified from a first-person, subjective point of view. Internalism suggests that the only way in which a belief is justified is if justification for that belief can be introspectively accessed. There are two forms of internalism: mentalism and accessibilism. Mentalism states that a belief is justified only by things internal to the person’s mental life (Le Morvan). Accessiblism in epistemic justification is determined by things to which the person has some special sort of access; introspection or reflection (Le Morvan). The grounds most closely associated to an internalist are non-genetic grounds. Non-genetic grounds can be defined as beliefs which are formed by providing “evidence” to justify that belief. These beliefs can “spontaneously” pop up in your head and they can be justified by researching these beliefs and then by providing evidence to validate the truth value of these beliefs. Ultimately, for an internalist, what determines if someone is justified is the subject’s main concern regarding the belief; the subject is justified by reflecting on the belief and then, when someone questions that belief, the subject will tell whoever asks, why they formed this belief; and this other person can/will validate that belief.
A common example used to illustrate the general view for internalism is Aunt Haddy and her bunions: Aunt Haddy predicts the weather depending on how her bunions look. When people ask her “what will the weather be like today and why do predict it will be as you say?”, she would respond “because my bunions look a certain way and when they look a certain way it means the weather will be as I say.” Is Aunt Haddy justified in her beliefs about the weather based on her bunions? The internalist would say yes and here’s why: from an internalist point of view, justification arises from beliefs only accessible to the subject. Thus, if Aunt Haddy has introspective access to this belief, then she is justified based on what she says. One may even go as far as to say Aunt Haddy has learned how to look at the bunions and determine its correlation with the weather in such a way that no other human can mimic what she does. Thus, Aunt Haddy is justified from a subjective point of view (Conee et al. 2000).
Externalism
An externalist simply rejects the internalist view; an externalists justification for beliefs is not restricted to what is introspectively accessible to the subject. An externalist can be justified from a completely third-person point of view, where justification for a belief occurs from what can be determined as a matter of objective fact, not justification to which one has special access, or is not internal to one’s mental life. A particular externalist view called reliabilism, is a derivation of the general externalist account. Reliabilists say that justification arises from processes that we deem reliable; a process is reliable if that process justifies the belief in the “right way.” Externalism is most closely associated with genetic grounds. Beliefs are formed genetically when someone or something causes a belief to be formed. Typically, with regards to externalism, justification is restricted to the third-person view, reliabilism, or the causal nature of the beliefs.
An example most commonly used to illustrate the most general of the externalists view is the gypsy lawyer example. A very respectful lawyer, of the gypsy way of life, is assigned a murder case where his client is accused of being guilty of the murder, which has very strong evidence to prove that his client committed the murder. To determine if his client is actually guilty or if his client is innocent, the lawyer takes tarot cards and places them down on the table. Whichever cards are drawn and in whatever order they appear determines the guilt or innocence of his client. In this case, the tarot cards say his client is innocent. His gypsy faith involving the tarot cards causes him to believe his client to be innocent (and for the sake of this example, let’s say his client really is innocent, although it is unbeknownst to the lawyer). The lawyer then proves his client’s innocence to the jury by providing evidence via a reliable line of reasoning. According to externalism, the lawyer is justified in believing in his client’s innocence because his belief was causally formed. His belief in his client was caused by the reading of the tarot cards and the evidence he provides the jury verifies his truth value of his belief.
A specific view of externalism, called reliabilism, states that one can be justified for a belief if the belief is formed, justified, or maintained in a “reliable” way. An example for a belief being externally justified via reliabilism is Norman and his clairvoyance. I have a friend I call Norman who happens to be clairvoyant. Let’s say his clairvoyant “specialty” is in locating the President of the United States at any given time. If you ask him where the President of the United States is currently located, he’ll give an answer and his answer is always right. But, Norman is not sure how he knows this; he’s not aware of his clairvoyance. To take this situation to another level, imagine that Norman has a transmitter surgically implanted in his head (which Norman is unaware of) and there is a beacon surgically implanted in the President’s head (which the President is unaware of). An externalist’s conception of epistemic justification would say Norman knows where the President of the United States is at all times. Although Norman is not aware of his “clairvoyance,” the process, by which Norman comes to know, is known from the third-person point of view and is formed from a very reliable process. This example is a threat to internalism because no introspective access is required for Norman to be justified and the belief (where the President is located) is genetically or causally formed.
Problems with Internalism
To most people, the view of justification regarding Aunt Haddy and her bunions does not settle too well in their stomachs; it sounds a bit too uncertain and merely blurred with being “accidentally true.” The objection most externalists would raise regarding this example is the process in which the belief was formed. Recall from earlier, externalists can be justified for some beliefs depending on the process in which the belief was formed; i.e. a belief being formed in the right way. And, for that case, the last time I checked, looking at bunions to predict the weather wasn’t a very reliable process. Thus, if we take reliabilism to be true, we can conclude that this view of Internalism may not the best concept used for justification.
Problems with Externalism
With regards to the first example (gypsy lawyer) to support externalism, the most common objection is the relevance of whatever it is that causes someone (in the gypsy lawyer example, the tarot cards) to form the belief (his client is innocent). The method with which the gypsy lawyer forms his belief, the tarot cards, is obviously not an infallible method for determining what’s true and what’s not true. His methodology for forming the belief that his client is innocent can be seen to be more of a rational process. He forms the belief based on the tarot cards and then attempts to find sufficient evidence to prove (or justify) his belief that his client is innocent. The evidence he provides to prove his client’s innocence can be interpreted as merely the reason for his belief. If the lawyer were to have formed his belief based on the tarot cards and then presented what cards were drawn to the jury, he wouldn’t have convinced anybody that his client was innocent. It may be assumed that the gypsy lawyer would then doubt his own belief of his client’s innocence and maybe, not reject it, but not be fully convinced that his client was in fact innocent, especially since the evidence is so strong. The fact that the lawyer sincerely recognizes that the reason (the evidence) supports the belief indicates that the belief is based on the reason (Korcz 1997). If this is not the case, (if his belief is not based on the reason), then it would appear as though this would mimic the Aunt Haddy example, where the gypsy’s expertise in reading tarot cards is only justified to the subject; the gypsy lawyer in this case.
A common objection to the second example (Norman and his clairvoyance) is the fact that the example is too constrictive by the causal relationship between the signaling of the transmitter and the belief of where the President is located. The only thing that is connecting the belief to the justification is its causal relation. Miller says beliefs may rely on causal events, but justification for believing (or to justify the justification of the belief) does not need to be known causally. Thus, if the causal relation is not a necessary condition for the justification of a belief, then it is logically possible to assume there are other ways beliefs can be justified and we should in turn not restrict justification to the causal nature of beliefs.
The “Pragmatic View of Justification”
“What’s relevant to truth is what is important. So why restrict justification to anything?” (Miller in Conversation). The pragmatic view simply states that we should hold the view of justification that benefits us the most. There are some circumstances in which a subjective point of view for justification will benefit all of us more than an objective, third-person point of view and vice versa. There are also circumstances where both, a subjective and an objective point of view (used together) can be the most beneficial in the process of justifying a belief. So why limit ourselves or narrow the scope of justification? Most critics of internalism or externalism are attempting to narrow the scope of the concept to be “more accurate;” to be able allow less false beliefs in but at the same time allowing less true beliefs in as well. Descartes believed in (what we will call) the “operating room” model of justification. Descartes attempted to say it is best for us to not let any contaminants (false beliefs) in the operating room (our minds) at all. This process would make the concept of justification too specific to do us any good in surviving in the world; we would ultimately be letting in less true beliefs along with less false beliefs. And, as was stated earlier in this paper, the ultimate goal in epistemology is to maximize the true beliefs and minimize the false beliefs.
The pragmatic view, on the other hand, can be illustrated with (what Dr. Miller calls) the “dirty house example.” Its okay to let dirt (false beliefs) in the house (our minds), as long as you clean up the dirt (get rid of false beliefs) to make the house as clean as you can (to maximize true beliefs/minimize false beliefs). The purpose of the investigation between externalism and internalism (and for all concepts in epistemology) is to ultimately determine a process or concept which maximizes the amount of true beliefs and minimizing the amount of false beliefs, while maintaining enough beliefs to allow us to live our lives sufficiently. It seems that a “pragmatic” view of justification is the best, and in my opinion, should be the only approach we use to justify beliefs.
To at least recognize the skeptics with regards to externalism and internalism, they claim no one is justified in believing anything. No matter by what process someone claims to be justified, they simply are not justified. A pragmatist would respond by asking what good does it do any of us to hold the view none of us are justified in believing anything? It does no good. It doesn’t make us expand our concept of justification or expand on the process by which we become justified. If anything, the skeptic is attempting to narrow the scope of justification more so than contemporary internalists and externalists are trying to do. Thus, in my opinion, it is useless to even consider the skeptic being “right” in saying none of us are justified in anything.
Conclusion
I have very briefly defined internalism and externalism and vaguely illustrated what each definition is trying to capture using examples. In these examples, I attempted to make it apparent what the common flaws were in the current theories. I then introduced a newer view of justification called a “Pragmatic view of justification,” introduced by Richard Miller. The details to the pragmatic view still need to be worked out, but even in its immature stages, it should be obvious the benefit of disregarding the current concept of internalism and externalism and adopting the pragmatic view.
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